Understanding Nihilism
Nihilism is often looked at in the context of the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche or topics on the death of meaning or the belief that nothing really matters and there ultimately are no moral principles, or what might be thought of as absolute nihilism. While this is certainly a valid and important topic, it is not what nihilism originally referred to. Leaving aside for a moment the topic of Nietzsche and nihilism, as well as the more contemporary topic of meaninglessness, let us look at nihilism in its original and general sense. Its early popular connotation was in reference to what is now distinguished as political nihilism. In its early usage, it referred to people, certain social and political revolutionaries. These figures were actually associated with various ideologies: socialism, anarchism, secularism, scientism, and materialism in mid-19th century Germany and Russia. The term gained prominence in Russia as they came to take on the characterization of nihilism after the publication of Ivan Turgenev’s novel Brothers and Sons, and especially the character of the “new man”, Bazarov. This latter point is of critical importance to Russian nihilism and the author Fyodor Dostoevsky, and we will come back to this point in a later post.
Why were they characterized as nihilistic, and then what does nihilism mean? They were characterized as nihilistic because their ideas held particular moral values and truth claims that, in order to be realized, demanded the annihilation, i.e. the destruction, of the current moral and social order. In fact, this demand was for violent erasure of the current order. They believed that they would make a new and better world in its place. It is an attitude of radical negation that can be held by any ideology, that the current moral and political order has to be subverted, rebelled against, and annihilated in order to replace it with another moral and political order. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines political nihilism as: “[…] associated with the belief that the destruction of all existing political, social, and religious order is a prerequisite for any future improvement” (IEP, Nihilism). Generally, this meant within the context of particular nihilisms, as we will see.
19th Century German and Russian Contexts
There are some complex theoretical accounts of early nihilism. I will try to share the upshot of one in hopes that it will contribute to the general sense of nihilism. Michael Allen Gillespie’s work on the topic is largely a genealogy of modernity regarding the issue of nihilism. He attempts to trace influences of nihilism in Germany before Nietzsche in philosophical discourse that was influenced from the nominalism of Descartes’ concept of “absolute I” and Kant’s concept of noumena through Fichte and German idealism to German Left Hegelians and romantics in the early 19th century. The upshot of his theory of pre-Nietzschean nihilism in Germany is that it is a rejection of classical reason and the old Christian order of divine omnipotence and moral principles for a demonic conception of individual omnipotence of human will and ego. If you are interested in that, check out his book. The contexts of nihilism in Russia in that century and also in Germany later in the 20th century were different, though with some influence by German Left Hegelians, still. And indeed the later nihilism of the Russians seems to have influenced Nietzsche’s conception of the topic due to him reading them, though Gillespie contends that Nietzsche misunderstood nihilism which resulted in an influential succession of misunderstandings of it by later thinkers. But there was also a key difference between contemporary 19th century forms of German (pre-Nietzschean) and Russian nihilism.
That key difference, and what should be noted as an important characteristic of nihilists, is on the question of freedom and individual will power. With German nihilists on this question more dogmatically influenced by Left Hegelianism the effect was as follows: “[…] in contradistinction to the development of German Left Hegelianism, which accepted the necessity of the dialectical development of history and consequently a severe limitation on the freedom and power of human will, Russian nihilism attributed to man an almost absolute power to transform his social and political existence. The theoretical basis for this nihilist view was the belief that history was determined not by immutable laws but by free individuals.” (Gillespie, p. 141) Another key characteristic was the idea that the “new men” of the Russian nihilist intelligentsia were were not men of words, but men of praxis (deeds or action). Therefore it is important when framing the conception of nihilism to understand these key characteristics: revolutionary negation and annihilation, self-dependent freedom, will power, and action. As Gillespie puts it, “[t]heir principal aim was negation that aimed at liberating man’s Promethean powers.”
There were also differences among the nihilist thinkers of this Russian intelligentsia, and some details of what should be done according to the nihilist imperative also differed. But the general sense was agreed upon with the framework and attitude that we have laid out so far.
20th Century German Nihilism
Where in 19th century Russia it was figures like Herzen (1812-70), Bakhunin (1814-76), Nechaev (1847-83), and Chernyshevsky (1828-89), associated with revolutionary ideologies like socialism and anarchism, in Germany it was a variation of German idealists, Left Hegelians, and critics of romantics. In early 20th century Germany, it was again quite a different context; but we can notice the pattern from the general definition we have developed so far.
We will refer to this period from Leo Strauss’ lecture on German nihilism. In this period, nihilism was the characteristic of an attitude against liberal democracy and modernity, and particularly against the Anglo-Saxon West iteration of values. Though the National Socialism movement might come to mind when thinking about this period, German nihilism was broad, and National Socialism was merely a species of the genus German nihilism, and nihilism was a characteristic of Germany in those days, according to Strauss. As he says, “[National Socialism] was its most famous form”. Strauss defines nihilism in this context: “the rejection [and desire for destruction] of the principles of [modern] civilization [the moral meaning of the Anglo-Saxon iteration of modern civilization]; the desire to destroy the present world and its potentialities[…]”.
Strauss expounds on how non-nihilistic motives nevertheless perpetuated an atmosphere that became nihilistic. For further contextualization and contemplation of what nihilism is then, it’s worth reflecting on this summary of one of the important intellectual and historical situations that influenced this nihilism, considering German nihilism in reaction to German idealism: “German idealism, while opposing Western philosophy, claimed to be a synthesis of the modern ideal with the pre-modern ideal; that synthesis did not work; the influence of German idealism made the acceptance of the modern ideal impossible; the Germans had to fall back on the pre-modern ideal: that is to say, on the pre-modern ideal as interpreted by German idealism, i.e., as interpreted in a polemic intention against the Enlightenment; and therefore: on a modern distortion of the pre-modern ideal.” “The modern ideal is of English origin: the German tradition is a tradition of criticism of the modern ideal. While the English found a working amalgamation of the modern ideal with the classical ideal, the Germans overemphasized the break in the tradition so much that they were ultimately led from the rejection of modern civilisation to the rejection of the principle of civilisation as such, i.e., to nihilism; the English gentlemen as an imperial nation vs. the German Herren as a nation of provincial, resentful fanatics.”
After WWI, aside from distrust and disappointment with liberal democracy, there were the alternatives: a reactionary stance; attempting to return to the past; and lastly, communism. Germany and Europe had suffered greatly from WWI, and this deeply affected notions of meaning, morality, good and evil, and the socio-political prospects of future society. It seems that any moral protests and philosophical debates that characterized the buildup to German nihilism are perfectly reasonable. As Strauss explains, the post-war (WWI) situation was complex and difficult to give an account of the emotions and beliefs. One can only elaborate on them to scratch the surface. But for our purpose here, it’s important to recognize the point at which nihilism comes to define the situation. It’s also critical to understand by now that nihilism can take on any ideological or societal situation, and is therefore not limited to Germany, Russia, any one religion, socialism, militarism, anarchism, conservatism, or otherwise.
This is all I will say about political nihilism, or what nihilism originally meant, for now. In future posts I would like to explore another form of nihilism, namely existential nihilism. And perhaps it would be good to look at particular figures on the topic of nihilism as well, such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Keiji Nishitani, Yukio Mishima, and others. But there is much more to discuss on this topic.
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